OVER THE PAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY, unlike the preceding 25 years, there have been many banking crises around the world. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999) , for example, document 69 crises in developed and emerging market countries since the late 1970s. In a recent historical study of 21 countries, Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001) report only one banking crisis in the quarter of a century after 1945 but 19 since then.
This article considers the ways in which banking crises can impose costs on the broader economy and presents estimates of those costs. In particular, the article focuses on cross-country estimates of the direct fiscal costs of crisis resolution and the broader welfare costs, approximated by output losses, associated with banking crises.
Costs of banking crises -an overview
A crisis in all or part of the banking sector may impose costs on the economy as a whole or parts within it. First, 'stakeholders' in the failed bank will be directly affected. These include shareholders, the value of whose equity holdings will decline or disappear; depositors who face the risk of losing all, or part, of their savings and the cost of portfolio reallocation; other creditors of the banks who may not get repaid; and borrowers, who may be dependent on banks for funding and could face difficulties in finding alternative sources. In addition, taxpayers may incur direct costs as a result of public sector crisis resolution -cross-country estimates of these are shown below.
Costs falling on particular sectors of the economy might in some cases simply represent a redistribution of wealth, but under certain conditions banking crises may also reduce income and wealth in the economy as a whole.
A wave of bank failures -a banking crisis -can produce (as well as be caused by) a sharp and unanticipated contraction in the stock of money and result, therefore, in a recession (Friedman and Schwartz (1963) ). Secondly, if some banks fail and others are capital constrained the supply of credit may contract, forcing firms and households to adjust their balance sheets and, in particular, to reduce spending. Output could fall in the short-run. This mechanismworking through the 'credit channel' -was highlighted by Bernanke (1983) who attributed the severity and length of the Great Depression in the United States to widespread bank failure. Moreover, if investment is impaired by a reduction in access to bank finance, capital accumulation will be reduced and thus the productive capacity, and so output, of the economy in the longer run will be adversely affected.
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There is now a substantial empirical literature on the causes of banking crises 1 but there have been fewer studies measuring the potential costs of financial system instability. Yet it is a desire to avoid such costs that lies behind policies designed to prevent, or manage, crises. This article presents some cross-country estimates of the fiscal costs of crisis resolution and of output losses during crises. Although varying markedly from crisis to crisis, over the past 25 years cumulative output losses during banking crises have, on average, been large -around 15 per cent to 20 per cent of GDP. Moreover, whether banking crises cause or are the result of recession they exacerbate subsequent declines in output, as well as often being costly to resolve.
because banks under capital pressure are limited in their ability to extend new loans. Under the Basel Accord (which is applied in over 100 countries) banks can lend only if they can meet the specified capital requirements on the new loans. Banks can, of course, reduce other assets to make room for bank lending but their scope to do so may be limited. Pressure on one or even several banks will only lead to a persistent reduction in the overall supply of credit, however, if other banks do not step in to fill the gaps and borrowers cannot turn to other sources of funding such as the securities markets.
One school of thought suggests that bank credit cannot easily be replaced by other channels because the intermediation function of banks is necessary for some types of borrower (see Leland and Pyle (1977) and Fama (1985) ). Collecting information on borrowers over a lengthy period enables banks to distinguish between the creditworthiness of 'good' and 'bad' customers. Bank failures could lead to the loss of this accumulated information and impose costs on the economy in so far as the information has to be re-acquired. In addition the specificity of this information may make it difficult for some borrowers to engage with a substitute bank if theirs is unable to lend (Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) ). In practice, the special role played by bank credit is likely to vary from country to country, and its availability or not will be affected by the nature and extent of crisis. In most countries, too, households and small businesses at least are unlikely to be able to obtain finance from the securities markets.
There is some US evidence, although not clear cut, that in the early 1990s pressure on the banks in some states led to a reduction in the supply of loans and affected the real economy (see Kashyap and Stein (1994) for a survey). In practice though, because banking sector problems are most likely to occur in recessions, it is not easy to identify whether a reduction in bank lending reflects a reduction in the supply of or demand for funds (see Hoggarth and Thomas (1999) for the recent situation in Japan). A critical issue, covered below, is therefore whether reductions in output are caused by banking crises or vice versa.
There are other channels too through which difficulties in the banking system (if widespread) can affect the banks' customers and the economy more widely. The banks' overdraft facilities and committed back-up lines for credit are one protection against liquidity pressures for customers, but Diamond and Dybvig (1983) also stress that by providing an instant-access investment (demand deposits) they provide another important mechanism. Most importantly, the payments system will not work if customers do not have confidence to leave funds on deposit at banks or, crucially, banks lose confidence in each other. A complete breakdown in the payments system would bring severe costs since trade would be impaired (see Freixas et al (2000) ). In practice, the authorities are likely to take action before a complete loss of confidence occurs.
The overall impact of a banking crisis on the economy depends amongst other things on the manner and speed of crisis resolution by the authorities. For example, a policy of forbearance by regulators could increase moral hazard and harm output over an extended period, whereas a rapid clear out of bad loans might be expected to improve the performance of the economy over the longer term. That said, such longer-run benefits need to be weighed against any potential short-run costs of aggressive policy action; for example, its effect on confidence in the financial sector more broadly.
Since the costs of bank failure can emerge in a variety of different ways, we have adopted in what follows a broad measure of crisis costs.
Measuring the costs of banking crises
There are a number of difficulties in measuring the costs of banking crises. First, defining a crisis is not straightforward. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) cover 69 crises which they term either 'systemic' (defined as occasions when much or all of bank capital in the system is exhausted) or 'borderline' (when there is evidence of significant bank problems such as bank runs, forced bank closures, mergers or government takeovers). These qualitative definitions have been used in most subsequent cross-country studies, including those cited in this article 2 .
Even when defined, measuring the costs imposed by banking crises on the economy as a whole is also not straightforward. Most cross-country comparisons of costs focus on immediate crisis resolution. Such fiscal costs are reported in the next section. But they may 2: Therefore, on this definition a crisis occurs if and when banking problems are publicly revealed rather than necessarily when the underlying problems first emerge.
simply measure a transfer of income from current and future taxpayers to bank 'stakeholders' rather than the overall impact on economic welfare. The latter is usually proxied by the divergence of output -and in fact the focus is often output growth -from trend during the banking crisis period. Estimates of these costs are also reported below. However, these calculations estimate the output loss during the banking crisis rather than the loss caused by the crisis. Banking crises often occur in, and indeed may be caused by, business cycle downturns (see Gorton (1988) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) ). Some of the estimated decline in output (output growth) relative to trend during the period of the crisis would therefore have occurred in any case and cannot legitimately be ascribed to the crisis. In the final section below we discuss the results of some recent studies (by ourselves and others) which attempt, using time series and cross-section data, to separate declines in output during periods of banking crisis attributable to the crisis itself from declines due to other factors. Table 1 shows a summary of recent estimates of the fiscal costs incurred in the resolution of 24 major banking crises over the past two decades, reported by Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Barth et al (2000) (see Table A1 in Annex A for the individual country details). In the table a distinction has been made between banking crises alone and those which occurred in conjunction with a currency crisis (so-called 'twin' crises)
Fiscal costs

3
. A currency crisis is defined, as in Frankel and Rose (1996) , as a nominal depreciation in the domestic currency (against the US dollar) of 25 per cent combined with a 10 per cent increase in the rate of depreciation in any year of the banking crisis period 4 .
Fiscal costs reflect the various types of expenditure involved in rehabilitating the financial system, including both bank recapitalisation and payments made to depositors, either implicitly or explicitly through government-backed deposit insurance schemes. These estimates may not be strictly comparable across countries and should be treated
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The latter condition is designed to exclude from currency crises high inflation countries with large trend rates of depreciation. That said, the data do point to some interesting stylised facts (see Table 1 and Table A1 in Annex A).
Resolution costs appear to be particularly high when banking crises are accompanied by currency crises. The average resolution cost for a twin crisis in Table 1 is 23 per cent of annual GDP compared with 'only' 4.5 per cent for a banking crisis alone. Moreover, all countries that had fiscal costs of more than ten per cent of annual GDP had an accompanying currency crisis. Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that bail-out costs in countries which experienced a twin crisis were much larger (13 per cent of GDP), on average, than those which had a banking crisis alone (5 per cent). Table 1 ) 5 . Alternatively, both the banking system and the real economy may have been better able to withstand a given shock because of more robust banking and regulatory systems, including better provisioning policies and capital adequacy practices. The difference in these fiscal costs of crisis may also reflect the greater importance of state banks within emerging markets (their share of total banking sector assets is around three times as large, on average, as in the sample of developed countries in Table 1) 6 , since they are more likely than private banks to be bailed out by governments when they fail.
As one might expect, everything else being equal, fiscal costs of banking resolution seem to be larger in countries where bank intermediation -proxied by bank credit/GDP -is higher. For example, during the Savings and Loans crisis in the United States in the 1980s, where intermediation by financial institutions is relatively low by the standards of developed countries, fiscal costs were estimated at 'only' 3 per cent of annual output. However, the problems were largely confined to a segment of the banking industry. In contrast, in Japan, where bank intermediation is relatively important, the resolution costs were estimated at 8 per cent of GDP by March 2001 and with the current stabilisation package might rise as high as 17 per cent of GDP 7 .
Fiscal costs incurred almost certainly depend on how crises are resolved (see Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997) ). Poor resolution might be expected to be reflected in crises lasting longer and/or becoming increasingly severe. In the meantime some fragile banks could 'gamble for resurrection' and thus 5: Some caution is needed in comparing non-performing loans across countries because of differences in accountancy standards and provisioning policies. eventually require more restructuring than would otherwise have been the case. That said, there is no clear statistical relationship between fiscal costs and crisis length for the sample of crises shown in Table 1 . Frydl (1999) finds a similar result. Recent work by Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) , however, suggests that the approach taken to restructuring is important. This analysis of a sample of 40 developed country and emerging market crises indicates that fiscal costs increase with liquidity support, regulatory forbearance and unlimited deposit guarantees.
As noted earlier, resolution costs may not always be a good measure of the costs of crises to the economy more generally. Large fiscal costs may be incurred to forestall a banking crisis or, at least, limit its effect. In this case, the overall costs to the economy at large may be small, and if the crisis were avoided would not be observed, but significant fiscal costs might have been incurred. Conversely, the government may incur only small fiscal costs, and yet the broader economic adverse effects of a banking crisis could be severe. For example, a banking crisis was an important feature of the Great Depression of 1929-33 and yet fiscal costs were negligible since there was little capital support for the failing banks and no deposit insurance. Hoggarth et al (2001) found only weak correlations and rank correlations between the fiscal costs in Table 1 and their estimates of output losses, reported below.
Output losses
Cross-country comparisons of the broader welfare losses to the economy associated with a banking crisis are usually proxied by losses in GDPcomparing GDP during the crisis period with some estimate of potential output 8
. Using GDP as a proxy for welfare though has its problems. First, welfare costs should ideally reflect losses to individuals' current and (discounted) future consumption over their lifetime. But, in practice, this is extremely difficult to measure. Second, changes in the level (and growth) of income may have more impact on individuals' utility at lower income levels than higher ones. This also complicates cross-country comparisons of welfare losses.
There are also a number of issues in the construction of measures of output losses.
Measurement issues
Defining the beginning and end of the crisis Everything else being equal, the longer a crisis lasts, the larger the (cumulative) output losses. The size of the measured cumulative loss will therefore be sensitive to the definition of the crisis period. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to define either the beginning or end of a banking crisis.
Defining the beginning of crisis Since one of the features of banks, given historic cost accounting, is that their net worth is often opaque, it is difficult to assess when and whether net worth has become negative. One possibility is to use a marked decline in bank deposits -bank 'runs' -as a measure of the starting point of a crisis. However, most post-war crises in developed countries have not resulted in bank runs, whilst many crises in emerging market countries have followed the announcement of problems on the asset side. Bank runs, when they occur, have usually been the result rather the cause of banking crises as defined in this article. Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2000) find, for a sample of 36 developed and developing countries over the 1980-95 period, that deposits in the banking system did not decline during banking crises. Since banking crises have sometimes followed reasonably transparent problems with the quality of banking assets, data on a marked deterioration in the quality of banking assets and/or increases in non-performing loans could, in principle, be used to pinpoint the timing of the onset of a crisis. In practice, such data are usually incomplete, unreliable or even unavailable. Another possible approach is to measure the beginning of a crisis as the point when bank share prices fall by a significant amount relative to the market. However, aside from the problem of deciding what is 'significant' , bank share price indices are often unavailable for emerging market economies -the countries where most banking crises have occurred in recent years. Instead most studies -including those reported below -date the beginning of crisis on a softer criterion, based on the assessment of finance experts familiar with the individual episodes (2000) which in a sample of mainly developed country crises includes a measure of losses based on the decline in real equity prices at the time of the crisis. The cross-country comparisons described below are dominated by emerging market countries where stock market prices are often unavailable.
9:
Caprio and Klingebiel's (1996) extensive listing of crisis episodes seems to be the source of most subsequent studies.
Defining the end of crisis As to the end of a crisis, one possibility is to define it subjectively -say, for example, based on the expert judgement or 'consensus' view from a range of case studies. An alternative would be to define it endogenously, for example, at the point when output growth returns to its pre-crisis trend (see, for example, IMF (1998) and Aziz et al (2000)). It could be argued that this would, if anything, measure the end of the consequences of the crisis rather than the end of the crisis itself. Both approaches are nevertheless included in the estimates below.
Both could underestimate output losses since at the point when output growth recovers the level of output would still be lower than it would have been otherwise. If instead the end of crisis is defined as the point when the level of output returns to (the previous) trend, the length of the crisis would be longer and thus the losses during crisis higher. Finally, such estimates of output losses make no attempt to measure any possible longer-run losses or gains in output after the crisis has been resolved -for example if the trend growth rate were permanently lowered -but this would be difficult.
Estimation of trend output during the crisis period To measure the output loss during a crisis it is therefore necessary to measure actual output compared with its trend, or potential. The most straightforward way of estimating output potential is to assume that output would have grown at some constant rate based on its past performance (ie to estimate the shortfall relative to past trend growth). This is the approach used in the studies reported below. But this approach may overstate losses associated with crises if output growth fell to a lower trend during the banking crisis period. For example, estimates of losses associated with the Japanese banking crisis may be overstated if the growth in output potential in Japan has fallen since the early 1990s for reasons, such as an ageing population, unconnected to the crisis.
In producing comparable estimates of the shortfall in growth against trend in a large sample of countries a standardised approach to calculate trend growth, based on past information, is necessary. The appropriate number of years to use in estimating the past trend is not clear cut. A number of studies have found that banking sector problems often follow an economic boom (see, for example, Kindleberger (1978) , Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1996) , Logan (2000)). If output growth in the run up to the crisis was unsustainable, basing the trend growth on this period would over-estimate output losses during the crisis period 10 . On the other hand, a banking crisis may be preceded immediately by a marked slowdown in GDP growth (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for recent crises and Gorton (1998) for a more historical perspective).
As shown in Chart 1, the data from our sample of 43 banking crises discussed below suggest that crises have often come after a boom in developed countries but broke at the peak of one in emerging market economies 11 . Average GDP growth in the three years before crises was above its 10-year trend in two-thirds of the emerging market countries and three-quarters of the developed countries. For most emerging market crises, output growth was higher still in the year immediately prior to crisis. In contrast, in nearly all developed countries, output growth fell in the year before crisis.
Measuring output losses: levels versus growth rates
Perhaps the most obvious way of measuring the output loss -but one that does not appear to have
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11:
Banking crises in transitional economies have been excluded from this sample because of their special problems of transforming from a government-owned to a market-based financial system. been used in recent research -is to sum up the differences in the level of annual GDP from trend during the crisis period. However, the IMF (1998), Aziz et al (2000) and Bordo et al (2001) measure output loss by summing up the differences in output growth rates between the pre-crisis trend and the actual rates during the crisis period. The output loss using the latter method approximates to the percentage deviation in the level of actual output at the end of the crisis period from where it would have been had output grown at its trend rate. All other factors being equal, however, this method will overstate losses associated with crises lasting for one year but understate losses associated with crises lasting for more than two years because it does not recognise the reduction in the output level in previous years (a formal explanation is given in Annex B). To see this, consider the example in Chart 2 where it is assumed that during a 3-year banking crisis period output is flat but that output would have grown by 3 per cent per annum in the absence of crisis. If output losses are calculated as the difference in the level of output from trend, output losses in the example in Chart 2 are 14 per cent of annual GDP -the whole area of the red triangle. But simply summing the difference between actual and trend output growth rates -the sum of the small white rectangles in Chart 2 -yields a cumulative output loss of only 9 per cent of annual GDP -the shaded blue rectangles in the chart are excluded from the calculation.
Thus, other things being equal, given that crises usually last for more than two years, estimates which sum up the differences in the level of actual output from its trend during the crisis period give a higher measure of output losses 12 . Below we show our own estimates of output losses based on accumulating losses in the level of output and these are compared with estimates from recent studies which are based on summing losses in output growth. Table 2 shows cross-country estimates from recent studies of the average output losses associated with past banking crises. The calculation method used in the IMF (1998), Aziz et al (2000) and Bordo et al (2001) studies are similar. All measure output losses as the cumulative difference between trend and actual growth during the crisis and so, as discussed above, will (everything else equal) understate output losses. The trend growth is measured over a relatively short pre-crisis period -three years in the case of the IMF (1998) and Aziz et al (2000) and five years in Bordo et al (2001) . The end of crisis is defined as the point when output growth returns to trend. The estimates of Hoggarth et al (2001), by contrast, measure output losses as the cumulative difference between the levels of actual output and its trend. Trend output growth is measured over a ten year period prior to the crisis, while the end-of-crisis year is determined, on the qualitative definition, by the judgment of experts.
Cross country estimates of output losses
There are some differences in the results from the various studies. Hoggarth et al's estimates of losses are somewhat higher than those from the other studies, suggesting that the effect of summing the differences in the level rather than the growth in output more than offsets the effect of using a longer, and usually lower, pre-crises trend growth. To explore this further, we calculated estimates of the mean and median output loss estimates for the 43 crises included in Hoggarth et al on a number of different bases. The results are set out in Table 3 . The estimates of Hoggarth et al (2001) based on summing differences in output levels (from Table 2 ) are shown in bold in the first column. The second column shows estimates where differences in output growth rates are summed during the crisis period and where the end of crisis is defined when output growth returns to its pre-crisis trend -the method used by the other Chart 2: Measuring output losses -levels versus growth rates studies reported in Table 2 . This analysis confirms that measures that sum output levels are usually higher than those that sum growth rates. Also, using a three year pre-crisis period to calculate the trend (rather than ten years) would, everything else being equal, increase the median estimates of cumulative output losses calculated using both summing methods 13 .
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Single 13: This is particularly true for measures when the end of crisis date, and therefore the length of crisis, are dependent on the pre-crisis trend growth rate.
Analysis of results
Overall, although there are marked variations in output losses across crises, as shown in Table A2 in Annex A, average estimated output losses suggested from all these studies are large. According to Bordo et al (2001) this is also true of crises before the Second World War 14 . The average estimates of cumulative output losses in years of banking crisis alone are similar across studies -in a narrow range of 6 per cent to 8 per cent of annual GDP. But as with fiscal costs discussed earlier, the average output losses during twin banking and currency crises tend to be much larger -in the range of 15 per cent to 30 per cent of GDP -and usually last longer. Again, however, the direction of causation is unclear. One interpretation is that exchange rate crises either lead directly to higher output losses -for example through requiring a tightening in monetary policyor do so indirectly through increasing losses for banks with foreign currency exposures or loans to sectors which themselves have large currency exposures 15 . The latter might be expected to be a problem particularly for emerging market banking systems for which external borrowing tends to be predominantly in foreign currency because of the cost of external borrowing in domestic currency. But causation may be the other way round, with larger banking crises causing a general flight from domestic assets and so putting pressure on the currency, which would be exacerbated if capital inflows are concentrated in the banking sector. Another possibility is that twin crises may be more likely to occur in the face of large adverse shocks that are themselves the main cause of the reduction in output Table 2 shown in bold.
14:
The exceptional period appears to have been the quarter of century after the Second World War when there was only one (twin) crisis in Bordo et al's sample of 21 countries and it yielded small output losses.
15:
However, the cause properly defined of the output loss here is, in fact, whatever caused the exchange rate to depreciate in the first place.
(relative to trend). The leading indicator literature suggests that twin crises tend to occur against a background of weak economic fundamentals, with banking crises more often than not preceding currency crises which, in turn, exacerbate banking crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ).
The results in Table 2 (confirmed in Table 2 ) -where output losses are calculated as the cumulative deviation of the level of output from trend -output losses (as a percentage of GDP) during banking crises are significantly larger, on average, in developed countries than in emerging market countries.
Why should banking crises last longer in developed countries? In general, financial systems in developed countries would be expected to be more robust to shocks than those in emerging market countries. On the one hand, this might mean that it usually takes a larger shock to cause a banking crisis in a developed economy, and that the crisis is harder to control and so longer lasting. This may be particularly likely if real wages are less flexible in developed than emerging market countries. On the other hand, given the greater strength of the financial system and real economy in developed countries, the effect of a banking crisis on the economy may be initially less dramatic, giving the authorities freedom to take less radical action. The share of bad loans in the banking system of emerging market economies at the time of the crisis is usually much larger than it is the case in developed countries (as shown earlier in Table 1 ), making the crises initially more pronounced -banks are more likely to fail. Furthermore, the banking system is usually a much larger part of the financial system in emerging market economies than it is in developed economies, exacerbating the effect on the real economy. However, although crises in developed economies are likely to be less severe, initially, delay in resolving them is likely to increase sharply the long run loss in output. A recent example of this may be the drawn out Japanese banking problems, which have lasted since the early 1990s. In contrast, in lower income countries, speedier resolution mitigates the effects.
Output losses plainly vary a lot from crisis to crisis. Understanding why may help to indicate what measures are most successful in minimising the welfare costs of crises. Bordo et al (2001) investigated this issue. In a sample of 21 countries over the 1973-97 period, they found that banking crises were associated with much bigger output losses when liquidity support was provided and when the exchange rate was previously pegged. However, the opposite was true of banking crises in the late 19th century where liquidity support was associated with lower output losses. They argue that the difference may reflect a greater reluctance of some countries during the 1973-97 period to allow bank failures. This meant that support was in some cases given to insolvent banks as well as to those that were fundamentally sound but illiquid. This, they suggest, may have increased moral hazard and enabled some banks to gamble for resurrection.
Costs of banking system instability: some empirical evidence -Financial Stability Review: June 2001 157 In an attempt to examine this, Bordo et al (2001) compared, for their sample of countries, the amount of output lost during recessions that are accompanied by banking crises with those which are not. They find that, after allowing for other factors causing recessions, cumulative output losses during recessions accompanied by twin and single banking crises over the 1973-97 period are around 15 per cent and 5 per cent of GDP respectively deeper than those without crises. There remains the possibility, though, that these results show partly that deeper recessions cause banking crises rather than vice versa 16 .
An alternative method -reported in greater detail in Hoggarth et al (2001) -is to make use of cross-sectional data comparing the deviation in output from trend (output losses) for countries that have experienced banking crises with similar, neighbouring countries that at the time did not have a crisis 17 . Benchmark countries are needed that, in principle at least, are similar in all respects to the crisis countries other than that they do not face simultaneously a banking crisis. Table 5 compares cumulative output losses in 29 systemic banking crises with output losses in pair countries (see Table A3 in Annex A for the individual country details) 18 . The definition of systemic employed is as in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999) : all, or most, of the banking system's capital is exhausted.
Since comparator countries are not identical in every respect the results of the comparisons should be treated with caution. But the estimates suggest that declines in output (relative to trend) for crisis countries are, on average, much higher than for the chosen pairs, especially for high-income countries. For example, output gaps in the UK and Denmark (neither of which had a systemic banking crisis) in the early 1990s were far smaller than in Finland and Banking crisis alone 12 n/a 9 n/a Banking and currency crisis 17 n/a 26 n/a Currency crisis alone 14 n/a n/a 18
Neither crisis 15 n/a n/a -5
Source: Bank calculations. (2001) attempt to address this problem through using a two-stage estimation procedure.
16: Bordo et al
17:
A comparison is made of the deviation in output from trend rather than just differences in output because trend output may differ between the crisis and pair countries.
Norway (which did). Similarly, output remained close to trend in both Taiwan and the Philippines in 1997-98 -the 'non-crises' comparators -although it fell dramatically in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. On average, the cumulative output losses for countries with banking crises were 13 per cent of GDP higher than in the non-banking crisis countries over the same period.
As mentioned above, evidence that output losses are higher in the presence of banking crises is not sufficient to prove that banking crises cause large output losses. An alternative interpretation is that causation runs in the opposite direction with deeper recessions (larger output losses) increasing the likelihood, and depth, of a banking crisis. To try to deal with this, Hoggarth et al (2001) investigated, where data allowed, a number of indicators of the future path of output growth to see whether the occurrence of crises can 'explain' shortfalls in actual output (from trend) against what would be accounted for by these conventional macroeconomic variables 19 . For each crisis and pair country the macroeconomic variables were measured as the difference between their value just (two years) before the crisis and their normal value based on their previous trend.
The results of two specifications for the whole sample are reported in Table 6 . The dependent variable is the deviation in output from trend. This is measured over the same (banking crisis) period for both crisis countries and their pairs. Four macroeconomic variables were used in the estimation -output growth (DYP), the change in output growth (DDYP), inflation (DCP) and the growth in bank credit/GDP (DCRED). Dummy variables were also included in the estimation to capture whether or not there was a banking or a currency crisis. It emerged that banking crises significantly affected output in developed countries but in emerging countries currency crises, rather than banking crises, most affected output.
Equation (1) shows the results of regressing output losses on the two crisis dummies and the four macroeconomic variables. A likelihood ratio test was used which failed to reject the null hypothesis that the statistically insignificant variables in equation (1) should be excluded from the final specification. To check whether the results were sensitive to the choice of paired countries, the same procedure was carried out substituting alternative pairs for a sample of the comparison countries (the 'paired' countries shown in brackets in Table A3 in Annex A). This made little difference to the results. Equation (2), the parsimonious relationship, suggests that part of the difference in output losses across the sample is due to pre-crisis macroeconomic variables. In particular, every 1 percentage point fall in output growth before a crisis adds 5 per cent to output losses during the crisis period. But the presence or The pre-crisis period macroeconomic variables considered were real GDP growth, the change in real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, the growth in credit relative to GDP and the growth in the ratio of M2 to M0. (b) The t-statistics corresponding to the coefficient estimates above them are reported in italics. * Indicates significance at the 10 per cent level. ** Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. BCH = 1 when there is a banking crisis in a high income country, 0 otherwise. CCL = 1 when there is a currency crisis in a low income country, 0 otherwise. DDYP = change in the annual average of growth in real GDP in the two years before the crisis period. DYP = annual average real GDP growth in the two years before the crisis period less its trend before this period back to 1970. DCP = annual average consumer price inflation in the two years before the crisis period less its trend before this period back to 1970. DCRED = annual average growth in credit relative to GDP in the two years before the crisis less its trend before this period back to 1970.
not of banking crises in high-income countries (BCH) and currency crises in low-middle income countries (CCL) explain most of the difference in output losses in the sample. These estimates and the interpretation of the results should, however, be treated with caution. The sample of high income countries is small, while the interpretation of the results could be that deeper recessions (larger output losses) cause banking crises in developed countries and cause currency crises in emerging-markets rather than the other way around.
Summary and conclusion
Theoretical studies and empirical work focussing on particular crises suggest that under certain conditions banking crises can impose large costs on an economy. Cross-country estimates of fiscal and output costs (both as a share of GDP) appear to bear this out. But the quantification of these costs, and the direction of causation, is far from straightforward.
The costs of banking crises are often measured in terms of their effect on fiscal expenditure. Cross-country estimates of fiscal resolution costs of banking crises tend to be bigger in lower income countries and those with higher degrees of banking intermediation. Countries with large fiscal costs of crisis have in the past often experienced a simultaneous currency crisis, especially those that had in place a fixed exchange rate regime.
However, resolution costs may simply reflect a transfer of income from taxpayers to bank 'stakeholders' rather than necessarily the cost to the economy as a whole. A better, albeit still imperfect, proxy for the latter is the impact of crises on output. However, a crucial issue in measuring output losses is deciding whether they are caused by the banking crises, and are thus costs of banking crises, or whether recession caused the crises.
The output losses associated with crises are usually measured as the cumulative difference in output, or output growth, during the crisis period from its pre-crisis trend
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. Although varying markedly from crisis to crisis, cross-country estimates of output losses during banking crises are, on average, largearound 15 per cent to 20 per cent of annual GDP. Output losses are usually much larger in the event of a twin banking/currency crisis than if there is a banking crisis alone, particularly in emerging market countries. Causation here is likely to run in both directions with larger banking crises causing currency runs which, in turn, may exacerbate banking problems, especially for banking systems with large net foreign currency liabilities. Crises have also typically lasted longer in developed countries than in emerging markets. Because of this, on some measures output losses during crises are larger in developed than in emerging market countries. One possible explanation of this is that emerging market economies must respond more quickly during banking crises because they usually incur much more widespread bad loan problems than developed countries. Bordo et al (2001) have attempted to separate out the impact on output during the crisis period caused by factors other than banking sector weakness. They found that recessions are usually much deeper when accompanied by banking crises than when they are not, even when allowing for other factors that may have caused the recession. Using a cross-sectional rather than time series approach, Hoggarth et al (2001) compared output losses in a sample of systemic banking crises with neighbouring countries that did not at the time face severe banking problems. They found that banking crises but not currency crises significantly affect output in developed countries, while the opposite was true in emerging market countries. These results also seem to hold up after allowing for other factors that may have caused output to fall. However, in both these studies there remains the possibility of reverse causation, with larger recessions causing banking (or currency) crises rather than crises causing bigger recessions.
Since there are large differences in estimated output losses from crisis to crisis, a potential fruitful avenue for research is to explain these differences. In particular, from a public policy perspective, it would be useful to better understand what type of resolution measures are most successful in minimising the welfare costs of crises.
Summarising, it seems to be the case that regardless of whether banking crises cause or are produced by recession, they exacerbate subsequent output losses (and are often costly to resolve). Policies aimed at financial and monetary stability are therefore likely to be mutually reinforcing. (e) Actual growth rate returns to trend during the first year of the crisis in Canada, the United States, Bolivia (1994 -), Brazil, India, Indonesia (1994 , Madagascar, Nigeria and Thailand (1983-87) .
(f)
Where crisis has not yet ended -Korea, Indonesia and Thailand on GAP1 plus Bolivia, India and Zimbabwe on GAP2 -costs are measured up to and including 1998. 
G1=
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